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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 5 78A-4-103(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court (R. 41 1-12,l Addendum Exhibit 1.) The appeal was transferred by the 
Utah Supreme Court to this Court. (R. 34-35 (Case 2321).) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly exercised its authority in: (a) denying 
the motion filed by RespondentIAppellant UBS Financial Services Inc. ("UBS") for sum- 
mary confirmation of a certain arbitration award (the "Award) that was entered in favor 
of UBS by the three-member arbitration panel duly appointed by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA) and agreed upon by both parties; and (b) granting the 
motion to vacate the Award filed by PetitionerIAppellee Thomas G. Hicks, I11 ("Hicks") 
on the sole basis that the trial court disagreed with the arbitrators' decision not to grant 
Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records. UBS addressed this issue below in 
its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration Award and supporting 
memorandum. (Memorandum Supporting UBS's Motion for Summary Confirmation, R. 
96- 122.) 
1 This appeal is taken from two consolidated actions: Third District Court Cases 
08090 1999 (" 1999") and 08090232 1 ("232 1"). When the district court numbered the 
record, the court started at page 1 in each file. Therefore, the record page numbers 
overlap. (For example, there are two distinct pages in the record bearing the number 10.) 
Because the record for Case 2321 contains only 36 pages and the vast majority of the 
record citations in this brief refer to the record from Case 1999, the few citations to Case 
232 1 are expressly noted in the text. 
In reviewing a trial court's order confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration 
award, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. 
More specifically, the appellate court's "scope of review is limited to the legal issue of 
whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or 
modifying an arbitration award." Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 
46, 7 12, 1 P.3d 1095 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
78B-11-118. Witnesses -- Subpoenas -- Depositions -- Discovery. 
(3) An arbitrator may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is appropriate 
in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to the arbitration 
proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the proceeding fair, 
expeditious, and cost-effective. 
78B-11-124. Vacating an award. 
(I) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court 
shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral 
arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party 
to the arbitration proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of suf- 
ficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the con- 
troversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B- 1 1- 1 16, so 
as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in 
the arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11- 
116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation 
of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice 
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
78B-11-116. Arbitration process. 
(I) An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in a manner the arbitrator 
considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding. The 
authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power to hold conferences 
with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the hearing and, among other 
matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any 
evidence. 
(4) At a hearing under Subsection (3), a party to the arbitration pro- 
ceeding has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, 
and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the trial court's decision to vacate an arbitration award 
unanimously entered by a three-member panel appointed by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority on the sole basis that the arbitrators purportedly denied Hicks 
certain discovery. 
On July 14, 2006, UBS filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA to recover the 
amounts due and owing on certain loans that Hicks had failed and refused to repay. 
(Statement of Claim, R. 189-246.) Hicks had previously agreed to arbitrate any and all 
disputes with UBS and, in so doing, acknowledged in writing that his ability to conduct 
depositions and obtain other discovery would be more limited in arbitration than in court 
proceedings. (See Forms U-413080, Add. Ex. 2, R. 142-61, especially R. 150,15, and R. 
1607 1 4) 
On September 7, 2006, Hicks, by and through his counsel, filed an answer with 
FINRA containing, among other things, counterclaims for allegedly unpaid investment 
banking referral fees. (Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of Counterclaim, R. 
248-56.) Hicks also filed a uniform submission agreement in which he voluntarily 
submitted the entire controversy to arbitration, consented to FINRA7s rules and 
procedures, including its discovery rules, and agreed to abide by and perform any awards 
rendered by the arbitration panel. (Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, R. 258-59.) 
Following a year and a half of proceedings, including extensive and protracted dis- 
covery, the arbitrators conducted the evidentiary hearing in Salt Lake City on November 6, 
7 and 8, 2007. (See Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, R. 329.) The arbitrators awarded UBS 
the sum of $647,362.56, representing the full principal amount due and owing on the EFLs 
plus interest, and awarded Hicks the principal sum of $161,128, representing certain 
investment banking referral fees.2 (a at R. 324-3 1.) 
2 The arbitrators initially issued the Award on or about November 15, 2007. On or 
about January 4, 2008, the arbitrators issued an Amended Award that included a 
provision setting off the amounts it awarded to UBS by the amounts that it awarded to 
Hicks. (Add. Ex. 4.) 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On February 4, 2008, Hicks filed a petition and motion to vacate the   ward.) 
Meanwhile, on February 8, 2008, unaware that Hicks had filed a motion to vacate, UBS 
filed a separate petition to confirm the Award. (R. 1-12 (Case 2321).) The two matters 
were consolidated before the Honorable Judge Robert P. Faust. On April 8, 2008, UBS 
filed its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration Award. (R. 96- 122.) 
After the trial court heard oral argument on June 13, 2008, it issued a Memo- 
randum Decision, dated July 8, 2008, in which it denied UBS's motion for summary 
confirmation of the Award and granted Hicks' petition to vacate the Award. (Memo- 
randum Decision, Add. Ex. 5, R. 372-76.) On September 30, 2008, the trial court entered 
a final order stating that Hicks "was denied critical discovery; denied the opportunity to 
present material evidence; and denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine 
witnesses, all of which substantially prejudiced Hicks' rights during the arbitration 
proceeding." (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 1, R. 411-12.) The trial court never 
specifically identified any discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied. (See id.) 
On October 24, 2008, UBS filed a Notice of Appeal indicating that it was ap- 
pealing both the trial court's decision denying UBS's motion for summary confirmation 
and the trial co~r t ' s  final order and judgment vacating the Award. (R. 4 13 - 15 .) 
3 Hicks' initial Petition and Motion are not in the appellate record, though they 
appear on the district court docket report for Case 1999. Hicks' Amended Petition and 
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award appears at R. 6-2 1. 
Statement of Facts 
A. The FINRA Arbitration Process 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA), acting under the super- 
vision of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, is the largest non- 
governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United ~ t a t e s . ~  (t& 
generally www.finra.org.) In fact, FINRA oversees over 5,000 brokerage firms, approxi- 
mately 172,000 branch offices and more than 676,000 registered securities 
representatives. (Id.) FINRA also operates the largest securities dispute resolution forum 
in the world, the purpose of which is to efficiently and expeditiously resolve employ- 
ment, business and investment disputes related to the securities industry. (See generally 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm.) FINRA recruits, trains and mana- 
ges large rosters of neutral arbitrators selected from a diverse cross-section of profes- 
sionals with knowledge and experience in the securities industry. (Id.) 
In accordance with the legislatively-enacted FINRA arbitration process, discovery 
is more limited in FINRA arbitration, thereby providing for the speedy and efficient 
resolution of disputes. FINRA7s Code of Arbitration Procedure ("CAP") requires, for 
example, that requests for documents and information must be "specific and relate to the 
matter in controversy." t& FINRA CAP Rule 13506 (Add. Ex. 6). Requests for 
information must be "limited to the identification of individuals, entities, and time 
periods related to the dispute" and be "reasonable in number." Id. Information requests 
4 FINRA is the successor to the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD). 
must not "require narrative answers or fact finding." Id. Standard interrogatories are not 
permitted. Id. 
Moreover, depositions are "strongly discouraged in FINRA arbitration. See 
FINRA CAP Rule 13510 (also included in Add. Ex. 6). The arbitrators may permit 
depositions only in the following "very limited circumstances: 
To preserve the testimony of ill or dying witnesses; 
To accommodate essential witnesses who are unable or 
unwilling to travel long distances for a hearing and may 
not otherwise be required to participate in the hearing; 
To expedite large or complex cases; and 
If the panel determines that extraordinary circumstances 
exist. 
Id. 
FINRA7s Arbitrator's Manual instructs the arbitrators to carefully exercise their 
judgment when considering a party's request for depositions and cautions them to bear in 
mind that arbitration should be efficient and expeditious: 
The effective use of discovery tools such as depositions rests 
in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care 
should be taken to avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to 
the parties and to avoid unnecessary delay. 
See The Arbitrator's Manual, August 2007, at p. 12 (Add. Ex. 7). 
B. The Parties' Arbitration Agreement 
On or about September 14, 2000, UBS hired Hicks as a Financial Advisor in its 
Salt Lake City, Utah branch office. (Declaration of Thomas G. Hicks, 111, 7 2, R. 23.) In 
connection with his hiring, Hicks executed a Form U-4, in which he agreed "to arbitrate 
any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . . . that is 
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the [self regulatory 
organizations, including the NASD] indicated in item 11 . . . ." (Add. Ex. 2 at R. 150.) 
At or around the same time, Hicks executed a Form 3080, in which he 
acknowledged that discovery is more limited in arbitration and that he would have only a 
very limited ability to have a court vacate an arbitration award: 
Arbitration awards are generally final and binding; a party's 
ability to have a court reverse or modify an arbitration award 
is very limited. 
The ability of the parties to obtain documents, witness 
statements and other discovery is generally more limited in 
arbitration than in court proceedings. 
(Add. Ex. 2 at R. 16 1 (emphasis added).) 
C. The Commencement of the Arbitration 
UBS advanced two Employee Forgivable Loans ("EFLs"), totaling over $1.2 
million, to Hicks over the course of his employment with UBS. (See Promissory Notes, 
R. 163-81.) Each EFL was memorialized in a promissory note, which provided, among 
other things, that the EFLs were to be forgiven in equal annual installments for as long as 
Hicks remained employed by UBS. (Id. at R. 163, 173 .) Each note also provided that, if 
Hicks' employment with UBS were terminated, whether voluntarily or involuntarily 
(other than by reason of disability or death), all unforgiven amounts shall immediately 
become immediately due and payable. (Id.) 
On February 27, 2006, Hicks resigned from UBS and joined Morgan Stanley. 
(Hicks Decl. 7 6, R. 24.) At the time, Hicks owed UBS the net principal balance of 
$647,362.56 on the EFLs. (See id. 7 7.) Although he resigned from UBS to join a 
competitor firm, Hicks failed and refused to repay the loans to UBS. (% Statement of 
Claim, R. 189-95.) Per the parties' arbitration agreement, UBS filed its Statement of 
Claim with FINRA seeking to recover the amounts due and owing on the EFLs. (Id.) 
In response, Hicks, who was at all times represented by counsel, filed an answer 
with FINRA containing, among other things, counterclaims for allegedly unpaid invest- 
ment banking referral fees. (% Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of 
Counterclaim at R. 25 1-59.) Specifically, Hicks claimed that he had referred two invest- 
ment banking clients to UBS: Extra Space Storage and Infinite Energy. (Id) Hicks 
sought referral fees in addition to those that UBS had already paid him with respect to 
transactions involving UBS and Extra Space Storage. (Id.) Hicks also sought referral 
fees in connection with a purported transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy, for 
which UBS had declined to pay Hicks any referral fees because that transaction was 
never completed. (Id.; see also Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8, at 7 7, R. 290.) 
Hicks also filed a uniform submission agreement in which he voluntarily sub- 
mitted the entire controversy (including his counterclaims) to arbitration, consented to 
FINRA7s rules and procedures, including its limited discovery rules, and agreed to abide 
by and perform any awards rendered by the arbitration panel: 
The undersigned parties hereby submit the present matter in 
controversy, as set forth in the attached Statement of Claim, 
answers, and all related counterclaims and/or third party 
claims which may be asserted, to arbitration in accordance 
with the Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations, and/or 
Code of Arbitration Procedure of the sponsoring organization. 
The undersigned parties further agree to abide by and 
perform any award(s) rendered pursuant to this Submission 
Agreement and further agree that a judgment, and any interest 
due thereon, may be entered upon such award(s) and, for 
these purposes, the undersigned party hereby voluntarily con- 
sents to submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent 
jurisdiction which may properly enter such judgment. 
(See Uniform Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, at 7 4, R. 258 (emphasis added).) 
FINRA appointed an arbitration panel consisting of three attorneys who were 
highly qualified and had expertise in the securities industry. (See Amended Award, Add. 
Ex. 4, R. 330.) Both parties, including Hicks, agreed to and confirmed the three-member 
arbitration panel. (See Scheduling Order, R. 26 1; see generally Amended Award, R. 324- 
Hicks, who was represented by counsel in connection with the arbitration 
throughout its pendency, voluntarily and fully participated in the arbitration and never 
claimed that his counterclaim should be litigated in a court of law, never requested that 
the arbitration panel grant him leave to file his counterclaim in court and never applied to 
any court for a stay of the arbitration or for a ruling that his counterclaim was not subject 
to arbitration. (See Answer, R. 248-56; Uniform Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, R. 
258-59; Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, R. 324-3 1.) 
D. Discovery in the Arbitration 
Although Hicks now claims that he was denied the ability to conduct discovery in 
the arbitration, that contention is entirely unsupported and belied by the record. In fact, 
despite the more limited nature of discovery in FINRA arbitration, the arbitrators went to 
great lengths in providing Hicks with the ability to conduct the type of discovery not 
typically permitted in arbitration. 
For example, in his counterclaim, Hicks alleged that David Reynolds, a former 
UBS employee whom UBS did not identify as someone having relevant knowledge 
related to the case, assured Hicks that he would receive "a close to seven figure com- 
mission" for referring an investment banking client to UBS. (See R. 253, 7 5.) In 
support of his request that the arbitrators grant him the ability to depose Mr. Reynolds, 
Hicks contended that Mr. Reynolds had information crucial to his claims and that, 
because Mr. Reynolds was no longer employed by UBS and not identified as a potential 
witness, he would have no other recourse to obtain that information. (Respondent's 
Request for Depositions at R. 272-73.) Although depositions are "strongly discouraged 
in FINRA arbitration, the arbitrators granted Hicks' request after considering the parties' 
briefs and oral argument. (Discovery Order, March 29, 2007, R. 277-79.) After Hicks' 
lawyers contacted Mr. Reynolds and realized that his testimony might not be helpful, and 
in fact might be detrimental, to his case, Hicks never deposed Mr. Reynolds. (Affidavit 
of David L. Reynolds at R. 283.) 
The arbitrators also provided Hicks with the very information which he now 
claims was denied. Although the arbitrators denied Hicks' request to depose UBS7s 
custodian of records after the issue was fully briefed by the parties and heard by the 
arbitrators at a hearing, they provided Hicks with the information he sought by other 
means. Specifically, the arbitrators ordered UBS to provide a sworn affirmation stating 
either that "there are no responsive documents or information" in response to Hicks' 
discovery requests or that UBS's "previously produced documents or information (which 
shall be itemized by name or description) constitute all the responsive documents or 
information that was found after the required good faith search." (Order re Cross 
Motions on Discovery, October 18, 2007, R. 285-86.) 
Accordingly, UBS produced an Affirmation detailing its efforts to search for and 
retrieve documents and information responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, identifying 
each category of documents that UBS produced as a result of its search and stating that 
such documents constitute all of the responsive documents that were found after the 
required good faith search. (Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8.) 
Further dispelling any notion that Hicks, as he claimed in support of his motion to 
vacate, was not granted access to the information he requested, the arbitrators ordered all 
of UBS's witnesses - including Virginia Weisman, who conducted UBS's search for 
documents and executed the Affirmation - to appear for testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing and to have with them all documents "in their custody or to which they have 
access" pertaining to Hicks' counterclaims. (Discovery Order, at R. 278.) Accordingly, 
all of UBS's witnesses appeared at and testified the evidentiary hearing, or were made 
available to appear and testify to the extent that Hicks wanted to examine them, and 
brought with them all of the documents they had relating to Hicks' counterclaims. 
(Affidavit of Anthony J. Borrelli 7 3 1, R. 137.) In fact, Hicks presented the testimony of 
Ms. Weisman as part of his case in chief and examined her regarding both UBS's 
document production as well as the purported transaction between UBS and Infinite 
Energy that was never completed. (Id. 7 32.) 
In addition, in response to Hicks' requests, the arbitrators empowered Hicks to 
issue subpoenas upon the two companies, Infinite Energy and Extra Space Storage, that 
he claimed he referred to UBS. (Id. 7 25, R. 136.) The only document that Hicks 
obtained in response to his subpoenas was an apparent term loan facility commitment 
letter, dated September 19, 2005, relating to the purported transaction between UBS and 
Infinite Energy. (Id. 7 26.) Hicks did not obtain any documents showing that the 
transaction was ever completed or that UBS earned any fees from it. (Id.) 
E. The Evidentiary Hearing 
Hicks never claimed that he did not have sufficient time to prepare for the 
evidentiary hearing. In fact, over the course of the prior eighteen months, the three- 
member arbitration panel ordered that the evidentiary hearing be scheduled and then post- 
poned for six months in response to Hicks' requests and to accommodate Hicks' claimed 
need to conduct additional discovery. (See Scheduling Order, R, 261-63; Order 
Rescheduling Evidentiary Hearing, R. 269-270.) 
Although Hicks' primary argument in support of his motion to vacate the Award 
was that he was unable to depose UBS's custodian of records, he failed to disclose that 
Virginia Weisman, the person who conducted UBS's search for documents and executed 
the Affirmation, appeared and testified at the evidentiary hearing. (Borrelli Aff. 7 32, R. 
137; Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8, R. 288-90.) In fact, Hicks presented her testimony 
regarding Hicks' counterclaim for alleged unpaid investment banking fees as part of his 
case-in-chief. (Borrelli Aff. 7 32, R. 137.) Among other things, Ms. Weisman testified 
as to the reasons why the purported term loan facility transaction between UBS and 
Infinite Energy was never completed. (See id.; see also Affirmation at R. 290) Ms. 
Weisman also gave testimony, in response to questioning by Hicks' counsel, regarding 
UBS's document production. (See id.; see generally Affirmation.) 
Hicks, on the other hand, testified that he had no knowledge whatsoever regarding 
the purported term loan facility transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy. (Borrelli 
Aff. 7 36, R. 138.) Despite having been granted subpoena power by the arbitration panel, 
Hicks did not present any testimony, sworn affirmations or other evidence from any 
witnesses associated with either Infinite Energy or Extra Space Storage at the evidentiary 
hearing. (Id. 77 37-38.) 
Accordingly, as UBS repeatedly stated to Hicks throughout the arbitration pro- 
ceeding, it was and remains to this day undisputed that there was no transaction between 
UBS and InJinite Energy and that, therefore, Hicks is not entitled to any investment 
banking referral fees. (Affirmation 7 7, R. 290; Letters to Hicks' Counsel at R. 3 11 and 
R. 3 13; Letter to FINRA at R. 3 18.) 
Although Hicks may claim that UBS failed to produce the commitment letter - 
which, per UBS's sworn Affirmation and Ms. Weisman's testimony, it did not have in its 
possession - the fact remains that Hicks obtained it in advance of the final hearing, 
moved it into evidence and had the opportunity to question any of UBS's witnesses about 
it. (Borrelli Aff. 7 27, R. 136.) Hicks also obtained UBS's Affirmation in advance of the 
final hearing, moved it into evidence and had the opportunity to question any of UBS's 
witnesses about it. (Id. 7 21, R. 135.) 
The arbitrators heard Hicks' testimony, Ms. Weisman's testimony as well as the 
testimony of all of the other witnesses, assessed their credibility and reviewed all of the 
other evidence, including the Affirmation and the purported commitment letter. 
(Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, at R. 327.) The trial court, on the other hand, did none of 
these things. 
F. The Award 
The arbitrators awarded certain amounts to both UBS and Hicks. (Id.) 
Specifically, the arbitrators awarded UBS the full principal amount owed on the EFLs 
plus interest, totaling $647,362.56. (Id.) The arbitrators awarded Hicks the sum of 
$161,128, representing additional investment banking fees with respect to transactions 
involving UBS and Extra Space Storage. (Id.) The arbitrators set off the amount 
awarded to UBS by the amount awarded to Hicks, yielding a net result of an Award in 
favor of UBS in the amount of $575,436.28 (as of February 8, 2008). (Id. at R. 328; see 
Borrelli Aff. 7 43, R. 138.) 
The arbitrators did not award Hicks any amounts in connection with the purported 
transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy that, as shown by the undisputed evidence 
adduced at the evidentiary hearing, was never completed. (Amended Award at R. 327.) 
G. The Trial Court Vacated The Award 
Instead of satisfying the Award, Hicks filed a motion to vacate the entire Award - 
including the amounts that UBS was awarded, which Hicks has never disputed - on the 
basis that the arbitrators purportedly denied his requests for two discovery items: (I) the 
deposition of UBS7s custodian of records; and (2) certain metadata relating to a 
Powerpoint presentation regarding UBS's investment banking referral fee policy. (Mem. 
Supp. Amended Pet. and Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, R. 8-2 1 .) 
On April 8, 2008, UBS filed its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration 
Award, arguing that (I) a trial court's potential disagreement with the arbitrators' denial 
of a party's discovery request is not a legally permissible reason for vacating an 
arbitration award, and (2) even if it were, the arbitrators resolved the purported discovery 
"issue" in this case by providing Hicks with the information he sought by alternate 
means. (Mem. Supp. UBS's Mot. for Summ. Conf. of Arbitration Award, R. 99- 12 1 .) 
UBS also pointed out that, while Hicks claimed that he was "unjustly denied access to 
the metadata, he had never even raised that issue to the arbitrators and they had never 
ruled upon it. (Id. at R. 120-21; see also Borrelli Aff. 7 29, R. 137.) 
After the trial court heard oral argument on June 13, 2008, it issued a Memo- 
randum Decision, dated July 8, 2008, in which it denied UBS's motion for summary 
confirmation of the Award, granted Hicks' petition to vacate the Award and instructed 
Hicks' counsel to prepare a final order that "should specifically outline the discovery 
which was denied to [Hicks] and explain the basis for the Court's decision that [Hicks] 
was denied the opportunity to present material evidence." (Memorandum Decision, Add. 
Ex. 5, at R. 375.) 
Hicks, however, submitted a proposed final order that neither specifically outlined 
the discovery he was purportedly denied nor explained the basis for the trial court's deci- 
sion that he was denied the opportunity to present material evidence. ([Proposed] Order 
and Judgment, Add. Ex. 9, R. 385-89.) Instead, Hicks submitted a proposed final order to 
the trial court in which he raised five purported discovery items that he supposedly 
requested in the arbitration and that the arbitrators supposedly denied him. (See id.) 
Despite his representations to the trial court, however, Hicks never presented four of the 
five discovery "issues" to the arbitrators and the arbitrators never ruled upon such 
<<. issues." (Id.) As UBS pointed out in objecting to Hicks' final order, the only discovery 
item that the arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of UBS7s custodian of records. 
(See Objections to Proposed Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 10, R. 377-83.) In fact, 
Hicks did not even raise most of these purported discovery "issues" in support of his 
motion to vacate the Award. (See id.) 
The trial court issued a Minute Entry on September 9, 2008 properly rejecting 
Hicks' proposed final order. (Minute Entry, Add. Ex. 11, R. 408-10.) However, despite 
its prior instructions in its Memorandum Decision for Hicks' counsel to "specifically 
outline" the discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied and to "explain the basis" for the 
court's decision that Hicks was purportedly denied the opportunity to present material 
evidence, the trial court stated in its Minute Entry that the final order that "should be 
simplified to reflect . . . in a general way, that the panel made certain discovery decisions 
which resulted in [Hicks] being denied access to certain key witnesses and information 
critical to his case." (Id. at R. 408.) 
As a result, the final order states that Hicks "was denied critical discovery; denied 
the opportunity to present material evidence; and denied the opportunity to adequately 
cross-examine witnesses, all of which substantially prejudiced Hicks' rights during the 
arbitration proceeding." (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 1, at R. 41 1-12.) The trial court 
never identified any specific discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied by the arbitration 
panel. (See id.; see also Memorandum Decision, Add. Ex. 5.) Nor did the trial court 
identify any instances in which the arbitrators prevented any testimony, excluded any 
evidence or limited any cross-examination. (Id.) Accordingly, the language contained in 
the final order provides no guidance to an arbitration panel if the arbitration were to be 
re-tried. (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. I.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow in 
scope, highly deferential to the arbitrators and limited to the statutory grounds for review. 
A trial court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators. 
Discovery matters, in particular, are left within the discretion of the arbitrators. 
Here, the trial court committed plain error by vacating the Award on the sole basis 
that it disagreed with the arbitrators' decision not to grant Hicks' request to depose 
UBS7s custodian of records. Moreover, the trial court substituted its judgment for that of 
the arbitrators with regard to a discovery dispute that was fully briefed and argued by the 
parties during the arbitration and considered and resolved by the arbitrators. 
The trial court's final order purports to provide three reasons for its decision in 
stating that Hicks was: (i) "denied critical discovery"; (ii) "denied the opportunity to 
present material evidence"; and (iii) "denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine 
witnesses." However, the trial court did not apply any of these three reasons to the facts 
of this case or even explain exactly what the arbitrators did (or did not do) that was 
apparently so improper as to result in Hicks' rights being "substantially prejudiced." In 
fact, the trial court's three purported reasons have no basis in the record. 
As to the trial court's first reason, the purported denial of "critical discovery" is 
not one of the statutorily-enumerated grounds on which an arbitration award can be 
vacated. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides that an 
arbitrator "may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is appropriate in the 
circumstances." 
Moreover, despite the more limited nature of discovery in FINRA arbitration, the 
arbitrators went to great lengths to provide Hicks with access to all of the information he 
sought. In fact, the arbitrators resolved Hicks' request for the deposition of UBS's 
custodian of records - the only discovery that they denied Hicks - by ordering UBS to 
produce all documents responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, to describe in an affidavit 
its efforts to do so and to have the corporate representative who conducted UBS's search 
for documents testify at the evidentiary hearing. 
The trial court's second and third reasons for vacating the Award refer to Section 
116 of the Utah Arbitration Act, which governs the manner in which arbitrators may 
conduct a hearing. Hicks, however, has never disputed the manner in which the 
arbitrators conducted the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, although an arbitration award 
may be vacated under the Act if a party is denied "the opportunity to present material 
evidence" or "the opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses," the party seeking 
to establish those grounds must show that its rights were "substantially prejudiced." The 
trial court, however, failed to hold Hicks to that high standard. In fact, the trial court did 
not identify a single instance in which the arbitrators prevented Hicks (or any other 
witness) from testifying, excluded material evidence or limited cross-examination. That 
is because the arbitrators never did any of these things. Accordingly, the trial court's 
second and third reasons for vacating the Award are inapposite. 
In short, the trial court vacated the Award for reasons that are impermissible, 
unsubstantiated and inapplicable. Accordingly, UBS respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's order and judgment vacating the Award and direct that the Award 
be confirmed and that judgment be entered in UBS's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY EXERCISED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
VACATING THE AWARD ON THE SOLE BASIS THAT THE ARBITRA- 
TORS DID NOT PERMIT HICKS TO DEPOSE UBS'S CUSTODIAN OF 
RECORDS 
This entire matter can be resolved by answering a single, straightforward legal 
question: Whether an arbitration award may be vacated on the sole basis that the 
arbitration panel did not allow the losing party to conduct certain discovery. Based on 
the plain language of the Utah Arbitration Act, the answer is clearly "no." 
When Hicks agreed to arbitrate any and all disputes with UBS, Hicks (and UBS) 
willingly gave up the right to the sort of extensive discovery mechanisms that he could 
have pursued in court. The trial court, however, refused to hold Hicks to this agreement 
and vacated UBS's arbitration award against Hicks on the ground that the arbitrators did 
not allow Hicks to depose UBS's custodian of records - despite the fact that both the 
parties' arbitration agreement and the applicable arbitration rules expressly limit the 
scope of discovery and did not require the panel to allow such a deposition, despite the 
fact that this purported discovery issue was fully briefed and argued by the parties during 
the arbitration and considered and resolved by the arbitrators and despite the fact that the 
Utah Arbitration Act expressly leaves discovery matters within the discretion of the 
arbitrators. 
Even if the trial court disagreed with the arbitrators' discovery decisions, including 
their decision not to allow Hicks to depose UBS7s custodian of records, that disagreement 
is not a valid basis for vacating the Award. Under Section 124(1) of the Act, an 
arbitration award may only be vacated if the party challenging the award establishes one 
or more of the following: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral 
arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party 
to the arbitration proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of 
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence 
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing 
contrary to Section 78B- 1 1- 1 16, so as to substantially prejudice the 
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in 
the arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under 
Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than the beginning of the 
arbitration hearing; or 
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation 
of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. 5 78B-11-124(1). Section 124(1) does not include the trial court's 
disagreement with an arbitrators' denial of a discovery request as a basis for vacating an 
award. 
The trial court attempted to get around this problem by stating that the arbitrators 
"conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B- 1 1- 1 16" and did not, as that section 
provides, allow Hicks "to present evidence material to the controversy" and "to cross- 
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing." Even if those provisions were applicable to 
the facts of this case (which they are not), in order to have the Award vacated, Hicks was 
also required, pursuant to Section 124 of the Act, to show that his rights were 
"substantially prejudiced." Although the trial court quotes this standard in its final order, 
it fails to apply it to the facts of this case and fails to explain exactly what the arbitrators 
did (or did not do) that was apparently so improper as to "substantially prejudice" Hicks' 
rights. 
In fact, Hicks was not denied the opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine 
witnesses and his rights were not substantially prejudiced. There is absolutely nothing in 
the record to suggest that the arbitrators prevented Hicks (or any other witness) from 
testifying, excluded material evidence or limited cross-examination. 
Despite the fact that Hicks submitted a proposed final order to the trial court 
stating that the arbitrators had "denied him discovery materials that he never even 
requested, the only discovery that the arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of 
UBS7s custodian of records. (See [Proposed] Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 9, R. 385- 
89; Objections to Proposed Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 10, R. 377-83.) But having a 
discovery request denied is not the same thing as being denied the right to present 
evidence or cross-examine witnesses. Indeed, Section 116(4) applies only to the manner 
in which the arbitrators may conduct a hearing and does not make any reference to 
discovery matters or other pre-hearing proceedings. And it certainly does not bestow 
upon a party to an arbitration an unfettered right to conduct discovery. When he joined 
UBS as a Financial Advisor, Hicks expressly acknowledged and agreed that "[tlhe ability 
of the parties to obtain documents, witness statements and other discovery is generally 
more limited in arbitration than in court proceedings." (Add. Ex. 2 at R. 161.) Having 
willingly agreed to forego more extensive discovery processes when he agreed to 
arbitrate any and all disputes with UBS, Hicks is in no position now to complain that he 
was not given all the discovery he wanted. 
Moreover, another section of the Act makes it absolutely clear that the trial court's 
disagreement with the arbitrators' denial of a discovery request is not a basis for vacating 
an arbitration award. In fact, Section 118 of the Act expressly leaves it within the 
arbitrators' & discretion to determine whether and to what extent discovery is to be 
allowed: 
An arbitrator may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is 
appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the 
parties to the arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the 
desirability of making the proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost-effective. 
Utah Code Ann. 5 78B- 1 1- 1 18(3) (emphasis added). Section 1 18 thus clearly reflects the 
Legislature's intent to leave discovery in the hands of the arbitrators, who, after all, are in 
a much better position to determine what discovery is actually "appropriate" given the 
facts and circumstances of the case before them. 
If the arbitrators' denial of a discovery request were tantamount to the denial of a 
party's right to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses under Section 116(4), and 
thus a basis for vacating an award under Section 124(l)(c), then Section 118 would be 
rendered meaningless. In interpreting statutes, however, a court's role is to "avoid inter- 
pretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Dep't 
of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 7 15, 24 P.3d 958. Moreover, in interpreting potentially 
conflicting statutes, specific provisions take precedence over general provisions. Id. The 
trial court's apparent interpretation of Section 116(4) violates both of these important pre- 
cepts. 
The trial court committed plain error in violating the express provisions of the 
Utah Arbitration Act and vacating the Award on the sole basis that the arbitrators did not 
permit Hicks to depose UBS7s custodian of records. As there was no basis to vacate the 
Award, it should be confirmed as a judgment. 
11. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS IN THE RECORD FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT HICKS WAS DENIED 
"CRITICAL DISCOVERY" 
Even if the purported denial of "critical discovery" were a valid basis to vacate an 
arbitration award, there was absolutely no basis in this case for the trial court to conclude 
that the arbitrators denied Hicks "critical discovery." In fact, the trial court did not 
identify any discovery that Hicks was purportedly denied. As the only discovery that the 
arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of UBS7s custodian of records, one can only 
assume that this is the sole basis on which the trial court vacated the   ward.' The 
arbitrators, however, were well within their authority in denying Hicks' request. 
Consistent with Section 118 of the Utah Arbitration Act, FINRA's discovery rules 
and arbitration guidelines provide that it is within the arbitrators' sole discretion to 
determine, given the facts and circumstances before them, the nature and extent of 
appropriate discovery. Indeed, FINRA's Arbitrator's Manual instructs the arbitrators to 
carefully exercise their judgment when considering a party's request for depositions and 
cautions them to bear in mind that arbitration should be efficient and expeditious: 
The effective use of discovery tools such as depositions rests 
in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care 
5 Although the trial court stated, in its Memorandum Decision, that "the panel's 
decision hindered [Hicks'] ability to present material evidence and his ability to 
adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness in the arbitration 
proceeding," the trial court never identified the "panel's decision" to which it referred, 
never explained the basis for its decision that Hicks was denied material evidence (as it 
indicated it would do in its final order) and never explained the basis for its decision that 
Hicks, who examined Ms. Weisman as part of his case in chief, was hindered in his 
ability to cross-examine her. (See Mem. Dec., Add. Ex. 5, R. 372-76; Order & Judgment, 
Add. EX. 1, R. 411-12.) 
should be taken to avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to 
the parties and to avoid unnecessary delay. 
See The Arbitrator's Manual, August 2007, at p. 12 (Add. Ex. 7). 
Notably, there is no basis to conclude that Hicks was entitled to depose UBS's 
custodian of records. On the contrary, FINRA7s Code of Arbitration Procedure ("CAP") 
expressly states that depositions are "strongly discouraged" in FINRA arbitration. See 
FINRA CAP Rule 135 10 (Add. Ex. 6) (emphasis added). In fact, FINRA arbitrators may 
permit depositions only in "very limited'  circumstance^.^ Having considered the parties' 
briefs and oral argument, the arbitrators determined that none of those circumstances 
applied to Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records. 
But the arbitrators went even further and resolved this purported "issue" by 
providing Hicks with the information he sought by alternate means. In lieu of granting 
Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records, the arbitrators ordered UBS to 
produce an Affirmation stating either that "there are no responsive documents or informa- 
tion" in response to Hicks' discovery requests or that UBS's previously produced 
documents or information (which shall be itemized by name or description) constitute all 
the responsive documents or information that was found after the required good faith 
search." (R. 285-86.) 
6 Under FINRA CAP 13510, depositions are allowed only to preserve the 
testimony of ill or dying witnesses; To accommodate essential witnesses who are unable 
or unwilling to travel long distances for a hearing and may not otherwise be required to 
participate in the hearing; To expedite large or complex cases; or "[ilf the panel 
determines that extraordinary circumstances exist." (Add. Ex. 6.) 
In accordance with the arbitrators' order, UBS produced prior to the evidentiary 
hearing an Affirmation detailing its efforts to search for documents and information 
responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, identifying each category of documents that it 
produced as a result of its search and stating that such documents constitute all of the 
responsive d
ocuments that were found after the required good faith search. (Add. Ex. 8, 
At the evidentiary hearing, Hicks moved the Affirmation into evidence and had 
the opportunity to question any of UBS's witnesses about it. (Borrelli Aff. 7 2 1, R. 135.) 
In fact, despite his claims to the trial court in support of his motion to vacate the Award, 
Hicks questioned Virginia Weisman, the corporate representative who conducted UBS's 
search for documents and executed the Affirmation, regarding, among other things, 
UBS's document production. (Id. 7 32; Affirmation, R. 288-90.) Accordingly, Hicks 
received (or at least had access to) the very information that he claimed was denied him - 
along with all of the other discovery and information to which the arbitrators provided 
him access. 
In short, not only did the trial court improperly vacate the Award on the basis of a 
purported discovery issue, it substituted its judgment for that of the arbitrators with 
respect to an issue that was considered, resolved and rendered moot by the arbitrators. 
111. UTAH'S STRONG PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION 
MANDATES THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
VACATING THE AWARD 
Utah has a strong public policy mandate that liberally encourages arbitration 
because it is expeditious and efficient. See, e.g., Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n of 
Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Utah 1996) (Utah Arbitration Act "reflects long-standing 
public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes"). 
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has instructed that trial courts should undertake 
only an extremely narrow review of arbitration awards. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) (standard of review is "highly deferential to the 
arbitrator"); see also Utility Trailer Sales v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) 
("[Jludicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or susceptible 
to repetitive adjudications, but should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures 
for re vie^").^ Otherwise, "the speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms 
would be greatly undermined." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947-48. 
In accordance with these well-established principles, the Utah Arbitration Act 
provides that discovery matters are left entirely within the arbitrators' discretion and that 
an arbitration panel's denial of a party's discovery request is not a permissible ground on 
which an arbitration award may be vacated. See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947-48 ("the trial 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or 
vacate an award because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment"). 
Allowing an arbitration award to be vacated because the losing party was denied 
discovery would defeat the important, legislatively-enacted purpose of arbitration as a 
speedy and inexpensive means to resolve disputes. Indeed, any arbitration award could 
7 The United States Supreme Court recently held that, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, arbitration awards are not subject to general review for an arbitrator's 
legal errors. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 1396 
(2008). 
be vacated upon the losing party's expost facto claim that he should have been entitled to 
conduct additional discovery and that such additional discovery was important to his 
case. At a minimum, a great number of arbitration awards would become subject to 
detailed, time-consuming, and expensive judicial review. 
This why the law is so clear in providing that arbitration awards are subject to only 
limited judicial review and that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the 
arbitrators. Otherwise, the whole point of arbitration would be lost. 
The Tenth Circuit recognized this in a case involving similar facts as the case at 
bar. In Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 847 F.2d 63 1, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1988), 
the district court affirmed an arbitration award ordering securities brokers, who resigned 
to join a competitor, to repay their employee forgivable loans. Like the district court, the 
Tenth Circuit refused to second-guess the arbitrators' determinations: 
[Tlhe sole question for our consideration is whether the 
arbitration panel ignored the plain language of the contract in 
refusing [the brokers'] interpretation of the agreement . . . . 
But this is a review of an arbitration award. [The brokers] 
agreed to have an arbitration panel interpret their contracts. 
Even if the panel misread the contract, we may not reverse for 
that reason alone. The court cannot say that the panel ignored 
the plain language of the contract, and the district court's 
decision must therefore be affirmed. 
Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in this case, the parties agreed to have an arbitration panel adjudicate all 
of their disputes, claims and controversies. They also agreed that the arbitration panel 
would determine the nature and extent of discovery and expressly acknowledged that 
such discovery would be more limited in arbitration. Even if it disagreed with the 
arbitrators' determination of a discovery issue, the trial court should not have vacated the 
arbitration award on that basis. Accordingly, the trial court's order and judgment 
vacating the Award should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Arbitration Act provides specific grounds on which an arbitration award 
may be vacated. A trial court's disagreement with an arbitration panel's determination 
and resolution of a discovery dispute is not one of them. On the contrary, the Act 
provides that discovery matters should be left within the sole discretion of the arbitrators. 
Even if it were a valid ground for vacating the Award (which it is not), there was 
absolutely no basis in the record for the trial court to conclude that Hicks was denied 
"critical discovery." Nor was there any basis whatsoever in the record to conclude that 
the arbitrators denied Hicks "the opportunity to present material evidence" or "the 
opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses," much less that Hicks' rights were 
"substantially prejudiced." 
In connection with its review of the Award, the trial court completely reversed the 
parties' respective burdens. The trial court did not require Hicks, the party seeking to 
vacate the Award, to demonstrate any of the statutorily-enumerated grounds for vacating 
the Award. Instead, UBS was essentially forced to show that such grounds did not exist. 
In short, the trial court incorrectly exercised its authority by failing to give 
appropriate deference to the arbitrators and by vacating the Award for reasons that are 
impermissible, unsubstantiated and inapplicable. Accordingly, UBS respectfully requests 
that this Court: 
(i) Reverse the trial court's order and judgment denying UBS's motion 
for summary confirmation of the Award; 
(ii) Reverse the trial court's order and judgment granting Hicks' petition 
to vacate the Award; and 
(iii) Direct that the Award be confirmed and that Judgment be entered 
pursuant to the Award in UBS's favor and against Hicks in the 
amount of $575,43 6.28, plus pre-judgment interest, post-judgment 
interest, costs, and attorney fees as allowed by contract and by Utah 
Code Ann. 5 78B-11-126. 
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